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• Another possibility is to shift landownership to the
spouse (using the 100 percent federal gift tax marital
deduction)12 with the spouse renting the land to the
production entity under a non-material participation crop
share, livestock share13 or cash rent lease.  For this strategy
to succeed, it would be necessary for the land owning
spouse not to be involved in the production entity as
partner, employee or otherwise to the extent that the
combined level of involvement constitutes matrerial
participation.  No attribution rules exist to treat spousal
ownership of land in this type of setting as land ownership
by the non-land owning spouse.
• Another possible strategy would be to convey the land
to another entity (other than a grantor trust) with the land
owning entity then entering into a lease with the production
entity.  Although a successful outcome (in terms of
avoiding self- employment tax) is not assured, it is believed
that income from self-employment would not be imputed to
the entity owners.
• Finally, some may prefer to simply pay the additional
self-employment tax, particularly if the amount of earned
income otherwise is approaching the covered amount for
OASDI purposes ($62,700 for 1996).  It is important to note
that HI tax now continues to apply to all self-employment
income.14
FOOTNOTES
1 Mizell v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-571.  See generally
4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 37.03[3] (1996); Harl,
A ricultural Law Manual § 4.06[3] (1996).  See also
Harl, "Renting Land to A Family Partnership,
Corporation or LLC," 7 Agric. L. Dig. 49 (1996); Harl,
"Renting Property to One's Corporation," 6 Agric. L.
Dig. 57 (1995).
2 Ltr. Rul. 9637004, May 1, 1996.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 T.C. Memo. 1995-571.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Ltr. Rul. 9637004, May 1, 1996.
9 I.R.C.  §  1402(a)(1).
10 See Harl, "Renting Land to a Family Partnership,
Corporation or LLC," 7 Agric. L. Dig. 49 (1996).
11 See 6 Harl, supra n. 1, §§ 50.03, 50.04.  See also Harl,
supr n. 1, § 7.01.
12 I.R.C.  §  2523.
13 See Dugan v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-578 (taxpayer
did not physically work on ranch, did not make decisions
regarding operations and seldom inspected animals; held
to be non-material participation livestock share lease).
14 Pub. L. 103-66, Sec. 13207(a), (b), (e), 107 Stat. 467
(1993).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
BULL . The plaintiff was injured when the plaintiff’s
vehicle on a public highway struck a bull owned by the
defendant. The bull had escaped from the defendant’s
feedlot by pushing against and jumping a five foot non-
electrified fence. The evidence presented by the testimony
of the defendant showed that the bull had escaped from
pastures twice before, the bull had a gentle nature, hay was
stored just outside the feedlot fence and the bull was usually
kept within pastures with electrified fences. The defendant
moved for a directed verdict after the plaintiff’s case was
presented and the trial court granted the motion because the
plainitff failed to show that the defendant had not exercised
due care in the restraining of the bull. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the plaintiff, through the defendant’s
own testimony, had presented sufficient issues of fact
concerning the defendant’s exercise of due care to require
the defendant to demonstrate that due care was exercised.
Nevious v. Bauer, 667 N.E.2d 1074 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996).
HORSES. The plaintiff owned nine horses which were
boarded in Wisconsin. The horses were seized by the county
humane society after the horses were found to be neglected
by the stable. The humane society notified the plaintiff in
Alaska that the plaintiff had to redeem the horses within five
days by paying for their maintenance by the county and
moving the horses to other quarters. After five days, the
county declared the horses to be strays, under Wis. Stat.
951.15(3), and placed the horses for adoption with members
of the society, their families and friends for nominal
amounts. The plaintiff sued for recovery of the horses,
arguing that the seizure and adoption of the horses deprived
th  plaintiff of property rights in the horses without due
process. The court held that the seizure of the horses without
allowing the plaintiff an opportunity for a hearing on the
seizure was a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional
property rights. The court also held that the random or
unauthoriz d actions of the society members did not excuse
the stat  from liability for the constitutional violation.
Porter v. DiBlasio, 93 F.3d 301 (7th Cir. 1996).
BANKRUPTCY
   CHAPTER 13    -ALM § 13.03.*
DISPOSABLE INCOME . The debtors had claimed
$15,000 of equity in their homestead as an exemption. The
exemption was allowed and the plan confirmed. During the
plan, the house was sold with $2,654.07 in proceeds left
after all expenses. The trustee argued that the proceeds were
includible in the debtors’ disposable income and should be
applied to the plan payments. The court held that, because
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the homestead exemption applied to the proceeds of the sale
of the homestead, the proceeds were not included in post-
petition disposable income. In re Kerr, 199 B.R. 370
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION   -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The IRS filed a claim for unpaid income
taxes due more than three years before the debtor filed for
Chapter 13. The debtor had failed to report income in these
tax years from a prisoner food program business due to an
error by the debtor’s tax accountant. The IRS argued that the
taxes were nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(1)(C)
because the debtor failed to file accurate returns and failed
to fully pay the taxes owed. The court held that mere failure
to file an accurate return or mere failure to pay taxes was
insufficient to deny discharge of the taxes and, in addition,
the IRS failed to demonstrate that the debtor should be held
responsible for the errors of the tax accountant. Matter of
Burgess, 199 B.R. 201 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996).
DISMISSAL . The debtor had filed a previous Chapter 7
case in which a federal tax claim was held to be
nondischargeable because of the debtor’s willful failure to
pay taxes. The IRS had a tax lien on the debtor’s property
and had levied against the debtor’s only asset, monthly
social security payments. The debtor filed for Chapter 13
when the eligibility requirements were increased and the
IRS moved to dismiss the case and objected to the plan,
both on the grounds of bad faith. The IRS argued that,
because the tax debt was the only debt involved in the case
and because the debt was nondischargeable, the filing of the
Chapter 13 case was in bad faith. The Bankruptcy Court
held that, under its holding in I  re Gathright, 67 B.R. 384
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986), app. dismissed, 71 B.R. 343 (E.D.
Pa. 1987), there was no good faith filing requirement for
Chapter 13 cases. The District Court reversed on this point,
holding that the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy actions to evade
payment of the taxes were “cause” for dismissal of the case.
The Bankruptcy Court also held that only debtor misconduct
or fraud in the bankruptcy proceeding can give rise to bad
faith sufficient to deny confirmation of a plan or discharge
in Chapter 13. Because the debtor had accurately filed all
schedules and met all Chapter 13 requirements,
confirmation could not be denied for bad faith. The District
Court affirmed on this point but dismissed the case based on
its first holding. The appellate court held that the debtor’s
pre-bankruptcy tax actions could not be used as a basis for
dismissal of the bankruptcy case. The appellate court,
however, held that a Chapter 13 case could be dismissed for
cause because of the debtor’s bad faith. In re Lilley, 91
F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’g in part and rev’g in part,
185 B.R. 489 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rev’g and aff’g, 181 B.R.
809  (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995).
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT . The debtor filed
for Chapter 7 and claimed a portion of the debtor’s 1995
refund claim attributable to an earned income tax credit as
exempt under Ohio Rev. Code § 2329.66(A)(9)(e) as a
disability assistance payment.  The court held that the
refund was not eligible for the exemption because the
earned income tax credit was not intended to provide
support for disabled taxpayers. In re Kurilich, 199 B.R.
161 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996).
INNOCENT SPOUSE. The IRS filed a claim for taxes
resulting from disallowed charitable deductions claimed on
joint returns filed for the debtor by the debtor’s former
spouse. The debtor claimed that the debtor’s signature on
the returns was forged and that the debtor had no knowledge
of the claimed deductions; therefore, the debtor was entitled
t  the innocent spouse defense available under I.R.C. §
6013(e)(1). The court found that (1) the debtor’s former
spouse controlled the couple’s finances and prepared the
returns, (2) the debtor always intended to file joint returns
with the former spouse, (3) the debtor had no knowledge of
the false charitable deductions either through knowledge of
the returns or from indirect knowledge, and (4) the debtor
did not receive significant benefits from the improper
deduction. The court held that the debtor was not liable for
the taxes resulting from the disallowed charitable deduction.
In re Michaud, 199 B.R. 248 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1996).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has issued proposed
regulations adding the rapid automated presumptive test to
the list of official tests for determining the brucellosis
disease status of test-eligible cattle, bison and swine. 61
Fed. Reg. 48430 (Sept. 13, 1996).
CONSERVATION . The CCC has issued proposed
r gulations revising the CRP regulations, including the
consolid tion of all CRP regulations in 7 C.F.R. Part 1410.
The new provisions include (1) inclusion of wetlands and
acreage enrolled in the Water Bank Program as eligible CRP
acres; (2) expansion of the conservation priority areas to
include CRP acres, the Wetlands Reserve Program and the
Environmental Quality Incentives Program; (3) restriction
of the to al CRP acres in a state to 10 percent of the total
cr p lan ; (4) provisions for an incentive of up to 25 percent
of the costs of restoring wetlands; and (5) provisions for
in e tives to enroll filter strips, riparian buffers, field
windbre ks, grass waterways, and EPA acres designated as
well ead protection acres. 61 Fed. Reg. 49697 (Sept. 23,
1996).
CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued proposed
r gulations providing specific provisions for crop insurance
for grapes as a grape endorsement to the Common Crop
Insurance Policy. 61 Fed. Reg. 49982 (Sept. 24, 1996).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations providing
specific provisions for crop insurance for forage crops as a
forage crop endorsement to the Common Crop Insurance
Policy. 61 Fed. Reg. 48416 (Sept. 13, 1996).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations providing
specific provisions for crop insurance for cranberries as a
cranberries crop endorsement to the Common Crop
Insurance Policy. 61 Fed. Reg. 48420 (Sept. 13, 1996).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations providing
specific provisions for crop insurance for fresh market
tomatoes as a fresh market tomatoes crop endorsement to
the Common Crop Insurance Policy. 61 Fed. Reg. 48423
(Sept. 13, 1996).
MILK . Vermont passed a labeling law which
required milk and milk product retailers to identify through
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signs and stickers (i.e., no product label changes were
required) the milk and milk products which were produced
from cows which had been injected with recombinant
bovine growth hormone (rBST). The plaintiffs were various
trade associations representing retailers and milk producers.
The plaintiffs alleged that the labeling law violated the First
Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution and sought a preliminary injunction. The
defendant, Vermont, stated that the purpose of the labeling
law was to inform consumers so that the consumers could
make purchases based on their concerns about rBST
treatment of cows and the economic and health concerns
from such treatment. The District Court denied the
injunction because the plaintiffs failed to show irreparable
harm or likelihood of success on the merits. The court found
that the costs of such labeling were minimal and easily
recouped from a minimal increase in the cost of milk
products. The District Court noted that the increase of
production from rBST-treated cows could decrease the cost
of such milk products, thus increasing the sales and profits
of retailers. The plaintiffs also alleged that even the minimal
loss of First Amendment freedoms was sufficient harm to
support an injunction. The District Court held that the
labeling law does not curtail any speech but only requires
truthful statements about the milk products. The District
Court also held that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed
on the merits because the labeling law did not discriminate
against out-of-state producers by favoring in-state
producers, since all producers are subject to the same
labeling requirements and both in-state and out-of-state
producers produce both kinds of milk products. The District
Court also noted that the state had a legitimate interest in
providing its consumers with full information about retail
products and that the labeling law was passed in response to
a variety of public concerns over milk products from rBST
treated cows. The District Court held that the labeling law
did not violate the First Amendment because the speech
involved here was commercial speech which could be
restricted by a substantial governmental interest, such as
truthfully informing consumers. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the potential infringement of First
Amendment free speech right was sufficient to allow a
preliminary injunction. The appellate court also held that the
milk retailers had also shown a likelihood of success on the
merits in that Vermont had failed to demonstrate a
substantial interest in the labeling of milk, because the only
identified interest was the interest of consumers and the
public’s right to know. The appellate court noted that no
public safety issue was involved because the FDA had
determined that rBST was not a health hazard to humans.
International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67
(2d Cir. 1996), rev’g, 898 F. Supp. 246 (D. Vt. 1995).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].* The petitioner was a PACA-
licensed produce handler. The petitioner was asked by a
customer to relabel shipments of New Zealand apples so
that the apples appeared to be Washington state apples. The
petitioner knew that the apples would be sold to third parties
in the mislabeled state. The petitioner eventually shipped
7,554 mislabeled cartons to the customer. The USDA
revoked the petitioner’s PACA license for flagrant, repeated
and illful violations of PACA, 7 U.S.C. § 499b(5). The
appellate court upheld the Judicial Officer’s holding that the
petitioner’s conduct was intentional, deliberate and knowing
and th  constituted a flagrant violation of PACA. The court
noted that although the number of cases shipment
mislabeled was not sufficient by itself to demonstrate
flagrant conduct, the large number of cases helped support
that ruling. The petitioner also argued that the conduct was
not willful because the buyer was not misled by the
mislabeling since the customer requested the mislabeling.
The court held that the mislabeling was willful because the
petitioner received a special commission for the act,
provided a demonstration of how well the mislabeling
would work, expressed doubts to the customer about the
propriety of the act and shipped more than 7,000 cases of
mislabe ed apples. The petitioner also argued that the full
revocation of the license was too strong a sanction and the
JO had failed to consider mitigating circumstances such the
fact that he petitioner was no longer in business because of
the viola ions. The appellate court upheld the revocation as
supported by the evidence. Potato Sales Co., Inc. v. Dept.
of Agriculture, 92 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1996).
WETLANDS . The plaintiff owned wetlands which the
plaintiff wanted to drain for crop production. The plaintiff
started the draining in 1984 and filed in 1986 for a
commenced-conversion determination under the
Swa pbuster provisions to allow the draining to continue.
The conversion plan was approved but did not include any
alteration to culverts under a road bordering the wetlands.
The plaintiff found that the draining would not occur unless
these culverts were lowered. The plaintiff had the culverts
lowered and the ASCS ruled that existing work would be
considered as part of the previous commenced-conversion
determination but the plaintiff could not do any more
conversion work on the wetlands. The plaintiff argued that
without the lowering of the culverts, the original conversion
plan could not have been realized and that the road was a
man-made barrier which could be altered without violation
of the conversion plan. The District Court held that the road
was not shown to be a cause of the wetlands; therefore, the
altering of the culverts was part of the conversion and was
subject to the Swampbuster provisions. The District Court
also held that the conversion exception was strictly
construed and did not provide any provision for the
converter’s intent in commencing the conversion to allow
additional work to meet the conversion exception without
prior approval of the ASCS. Finally, the District Court held
that the plaintiff failed to show any financial hardship from
denial of the further conversion work since the plaintiff had
not contracted to have the additional work done or otherwise
expended money to have the work done. The appellate court
affirmed, finding that the ASCS and the Distict Court
decisions were not arbitrary. Von Eye v. U.S., 92 F.3d 681
(8th Cir. 1996), aff’g, 887 F. Supp. 1287 (D. S.D. 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMERS- ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedent died in
1994 and had been the executor of the estate of a
pr d ceased spouse. The predeceased spouse’s will
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provided that if the decedent disclaimed any bequest, the
disclaimed property passed to a family trust for the benefit
of the couple’s child. The decedent had prepared a ledger of
estate accounts and activity occurring during estate
administration. The decedent also prepared an inventory of
estate property. The couple’s attorney had sent a letter to the
couple when the predeceased spouse’s will was drawn up
and the letter indicated that the will made provisions for
post-death planning by use of disclaimers. The IRS ruled
that none of the documents, alone or together, qualified as a
disclaimer for estate tax purposes because the documents
did not contain any language which could be construed as
the decedent’s unequivocal renunciation of property
bequeathed to the decedent. Ltr. Rul. 9640005, June 14,
1996).
In 1989, the taxpayer had established a 10-year grantor
retained annuity trust (GRIT). In October 1989, pursuant to
IRS Notice 89-99, the taxpayer disclaimed any interest in
the reversionary interest in the GRIT and a power of
appointment provided by the GRIT. A gift tax return was
filed for the gift tax effects of the disclaimer. In 1990, I.R.C.
§ 2036(c) was retroactively appealed. The taxpayer then
obtained a state court order retroactively disregarding the
disclaimer. The taxpayer argued that the repeal of I.R.C. §
2036(c) and the state court order removed the gift tax
liability for the disclaimer. The court held that, under Van
Den Wymelenberg v. United States, 397 F.2d 443 (7th Cir.
1968), a retroactive reformation of a disclaimer was not
effective to change the original tax consequences of the
disclaimer. Lange v. United States, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,244 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
GROSS ESTATE-ALM § 5.02.* The decedent had been
a beneficiary of a testamentary trust created by the will of
the decedent’s pre-deceased mother. The trust provided the
decedent with the power to “use the income and so much of
the principal as in her sole discretion shall be necessary and
desirable.” The court held that the trust granted the decedent
a general power of appointment over the trust corpus and
that the trust corpus was included in the decedent’s gross
estate. The court found no state law to interpret the trust
language and found that the language allowed distribution
of trust corpus for uses beyond the decedent’s health,
education, and/or support or maintenance. Hyde v. United
States, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,243 (D. N.H.
1996).
TRUSTS. The taxpayer was a beneficiary of a
testamentary trust. The trust was funded with stock, and the
trustee borrowed funds on margin from a brokerage account
and loaned the money to the decedent’s estate and
corporations owned by the estate. The loans were not
evidenced by repayment schedules, fixed maturity dates or
notes but the loans were ratified by the estate representatives
and the boards of directors of the corporations. The estate
did not have any distributable net income (DNI) for the tax
years involved but paid the trust interest on the loans. The
taxpayer argued that because the estate had no DNI, the trust
did not have any DNI from the interest payments. The court
held that the taxpayer had to include distributions from the
trust in gross income because the interest payments were
DNI to the trust. Geftman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-
447.
VALUATION . The taxpayer transferred a personal
resid ce and 43 contiguous acres to a three year personal
resi ence trust. The property also has a swimming pool,
pool house, greenhouse, tool shed, barn with attached corral
and quarters for a caretaker. The entire parcel had been used
as a personal residence property for over 100 years and the
neighboring properties are of similar size and use. The IRS
ruled that the trust was a qualified personal residence trust
under I.R.C. § 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii). Ltr. Rul. 9639064, June
27, 1996.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX- ALM § 4.01.*  A
husband and wife operated a potato farm and sold potatoes
to various buyers under agreements which deferred some
portion of the selling price until the following tax year. The
IRS examining agent did not object to the deferral for
regular income tax purposes but took the position that the
arrangement was subject to the alternative minimum tax
rules applicable to “the installment method under [I.R.C.]
section 453.” The Service agreed with the agent, relying on
Warren Jones Co. v. Comm’r, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975),
rev’g, 60 T.C. 663 (1973), in concluding that the tax
treatment of a deferred payment obligation depended upon
whether the fair market value of property received in
exchange can be ascertained.I  addition, the Service ruled
in the TAM that the outcome of the ruling involves a change
of accounting method. Further, IRS indicated that I.R.C. §
481 applies in determining the farmers’ tax for the year of
change. This ruling is discussed in an article by Neil Harl in
7 Agric. Law Digest, p. 93 supra. Ltr. Rul. 9640003, Dec.
21, 1995.
BIOMASS FUELS CREDIT . The taxpayer was a
lumber and veneer company which used scrap wood in a
gasifier to produce heat used in the veneering process. The
taxpayer leased a portion of its facility to another company.
The leased area was to be used for making veneer with the
second company’s equipment. The lease required the
taxpayer to furnish utilities for the leased area. The taxpayer
claimed a biomass fuels credit for the heat provided to the
leased area from the gasifier. The court held that the
taxpayer was not eligible for the credit because biomass fuel
was not sold to the second company; instead, the taxpayer
sold only heat. In addition, the court held that no sale
occurred because the utility costs were included in the rent
for the space. Norstam Veneers, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1996-443.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . Under an agreement
with a charity, the taxpayer purchased a house and leased
the house to the charitable organization for one dollar per
year. The house was purchased and leased to the
organization for the purpose of having the organization
renovate the house for use by the organization in its
charitable work. Once the renovations were completed, the
taxpayer intended to donate the house to the organization.
The organization used other donations and volunteer help to
substantially improve the property and the taxpayer donated
the house to the organization. The taxpayer argued that the
amount of the charitable deduction should equal the fair
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market value of the house at the time of the final donation.
The IRS ruled that the charitable deduction was limited to
the taxpayer’s basis in the property, the original purchase
price, because the taxpayer did not own the renovations or
pay for them. Ltr. Rul. 9639009, June 13, 1996.
C CORPORATIONS-ALM  § 7.02.*
COMPENSATION OF OFFICERS. The taxpayers were
brothers who shared the ownership of a corporation which
operated a scrap metal business. An IRS audit in two tax
years found that the corporation failed to report income
from the sale of scrap metal in each year. The corporation
admitted to the errors but claimed an offsetting deduction,
claiming that the income was paid to the taxpayers as
compensation. The corporation did not list the payments as
compensation in the corporate records nor did the
corporation include the payments in the taxpayers’ W-2
forms. The only evidence that the payments were intended
as compensation was the personal income tax returns of the
taxpayers for the second tax year. The court held that the
corporation was not allowed a deduction for the payments as
compensation because the corporation had no
contemporaneous records of any intent to make the
payments as compensation. T ol Producers, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,495 (6th Cir.
1996).
CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT . A state’s lottery laws
were amended to allow lottery winners to assign future
installment payments of lottery winnings. The IRS ruled that
the assignment of future installment lottery payments did
not amount to constructive receipt of the future payments by
the assignor, because the assignment did not affect the dates
of the payments by the state lottery commission. Ltr. Rul.
9639016, June 17, 1996.
EMPLOYEES . The taxpayer operated a sod laying and
landscape business which employed 16 people. The workers
consisted of a bookkeeper/secretary, graders, sodlayers,
truck drivers and one landscaper. The taxpayer treated all of
the workers as independent contractors and the workers all
signed agreements of understanding which included an
agreement to pay their own self-employment taxes. The
bookkeeper and main company truck driver were held to not
be independent contractors because the taxpayer exercised
sufficient control over their work and these employees
worked only for the taxpayer. The Bankruptcy Court,
however, had ruled that the taxpayer was not liable for the
employment taxes for these employees, under I.R.C. § 3401,
because the taxpayer had a reasonable basis for treating
them as independent contractors. The appellate court
reversed on this issue, holding that treating these employees
as independent contractors was not reasonable under any
judicial precedent, IRS audit or long-standing industry
practice. As to the other workers, the court held that they
were properly classified as independent contractors because
(1) the taxpayer did not provide instruction to these workers,
(2) the workers had the authority to hire other workers, (3)
the work hours were not set by the taxpayer, (4) the workers
were not paid at set intervals, (5) the workers made their
services available to other sodlaying and landscaping
companies, and (6) the industry practice was to treat these
workers as independent contractors. In re Arndt, 96-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,505 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
INTEREST . The taxpayers owned several businesses
operated as partnerships and S corporations. The taxpayers
made pre-1986 payments of tax deficiencies and interest in
rder to take advantage of the pre-1986 interest deductions.
The taxpayers, however, claimed the interest payments as
business interest deductions, whereas the IRS allowed the
deductions only as personal interest deductions. The
taxpayers argued that the interest resulted from the income
generated by the businesses; therefore, the interest payments
were business expenses. The court held that, because
partnerships and S corporations do not pay taxes, the
interest on taxes was not related to the businesses and was
eligible only for a personal interest deduction. The IRS had
also argued that interest on taxes was never a business
expense because normal business activity should include
timely payment of taxes. The court did not discuss this
issue. True v. United States, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,502 (10th Cir. 1996).
LIFE INSURANCE . A grantor trust was a general
partner in a partnership. The trust purchased a life insurance
policy on the grantor/trustee’s life. The trust, partnership
and grantor/trustee entered into an agreement under which
the trust owned the policy and the partnership paid the
premiums but would be reimbursed in part by the trust. The
policy was assigned to the partnership as security for the
trust’s promise to pay the premiums. The partnership had
the right to collect from the policy proceeds (either the death
benefit or cash surrender value) the amounts paid in
premiums, with the remainder paid to the trust. This is a
split-dollar insurance arrangement. The IRS ruled that
neither the trust nor grantor/trustee would be deemed to
have received a distribution from the partnership. L r. Rul.
9639053, June 20, 1996.
RETURNS. The IRS has issued new guidelines for
ordering Audit Technique Guides produced by the IRS
Market Segment Specialization Program. Purchasers may
now use credit cards for the purchases by phone (202-512-
1800), fax  (202-512-2250), mail (Superintendent of
Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954),
or the internet(http://www.access.gpo.gov).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
REORGANIZATION. The taxpayer was an S
corporation which formed a second shell corporation for the
purposes of merging the two corporations with the new
corpora ion as the surviving corporation. The reorganization
was intended to qualify as an I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(F) (type F)
reorganization. The IRS ruled that the merger would not
change the S corporation status of the old corporation and
the new corporation would qualify as an S corporation. The
IRS also ruled that Rev. Rul. 57-276, 1957-2 C.B. 126
provided guidance for determining the effect of the
reorganization on the taxable year of the corporations, and
Rev. Rul. 73-526, 1973-2 C.B. 40 provided for transfer of
the taxpayer identification number of the old corporation to
the new corporation. Ltr. Rul. 9639059, June 26, 1996.
SHAREHOLDER BASIS. The taxpayer owned 98
percent of an S corporation with one other shareholder. The
taxpayer and corporation each obtained loans from a bank
and entered into a cross-collaterization and cross-default
agreement which secured the loans with all the property of
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the shareholder and corporation, including subsequent
improvements. The shareholder constructed a building and
first leased it to the corporation before transferring the
building to the corporation in exchange for 400 shares of
stock in an I.R.C. § 351 transaction. The parties’ loan
obligations were not affected by the transaction. The
taxpayer argued that the basis of the 400 shares of stock was
equal to the shareholder’s basis in the building before the
transfer. The IRS ruled that because the building was
subject to liabilities in excess of the shareholder’s basis in
the building, the shareholder’s basis in the stock was zero
plus any gain recognized by the transaction. Ltr. Rul.
9640001, Nov. 29, 1994.
TAX LIENS . A decedent’s estate included improved
real property. In February 1991, the estate executor entered
into a contract to sell the property for $152,000; however,
the buyer paid only $76,000. The parties testified that they
had orally agreed to the lesser price and that the contract
price was set to fool the public. The buyer presented
evidence to the probate court that $152,000 was paid for the
property. The property was actually worth $359,000 and the
estate recognized a loss on the sale. The deed for the
property was recorded in October 1991 and showed a
purchase price of $152,000. On October 30, 1991, the IRS
recorded a tax lien against the estate for unpaid federal
estate taxes. The issue was whether the buyer of the
property was a “purchaser” under I.R.C. § 6323(a) against
whom the tax lien could not be enforced. The court held that
because the buyer did not pay full and adequate
consideration for the property, either as evidenced by the
purchase agreement or the actual fair market value, the
buyer was not a “purchaser” and the tax lien was effective
against the property. A & B Steel Shearing & Processing,
Inc. v. United States, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,506
(E.D. Mich. 1996).
TRAVEL EXPENSES . The taxpayer was employed as
a college physics professor and self-published a book on
physics. The taxpayer also presented public seminars at an
airport within walking distance of the taxpayer’s college
office. The taxpayer made several trips to popular cities and
visited the tourist attractions there. While in each city, the
taxpayer would visit book stores without prior notice and
would attempt to make some book sales. The taxpayer
claimed deductions for automobile expenses in driving to
the seminars and travel expenses for the visits to the cities.
The court held that the travel expenses for the visits to the
cities were not deductible business expenses because the
primary purpose of the visits was for personal pleasure. The
court also held that the automobile expenses for driving to
the seminars was not deductible because the trips were
primarily for commuting to the taxpayer’s place of
employment. Shelton v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-444.
NEGLIGENCE
LICENSEE/INVITEE . In a case involving a slip and
fall at a hospital, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the
common-law classification of licensee and invitee would be
abolished in favor of a duty of reasonable care for all
nontrespassers on property. H ins v. Webster County, 552
N.W.2d 51 (Neb. 1996).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
KIWIFRUIT . Calif. Food & Agirc. Code § 68001 et
seq., created the California Kiwifruit Commission for the
purpose of advertising, marketing research and production
research for the state kiwifruit industry. The commission
was funded by 3.5 percent assessments on the sales of fresh
market kiwifruit. The defendant was a kiwifruit grower and
challenged the assessments as violating the defendant’s
constitutional associational rights. The court applied a strict
scrutiny standard and held that the Commission failed to
show a compelling state interest in the kiwifruit industry
which could not be achieved with less restrictive means.
The court found that the Commission failed to show that it’s
efforts produced any effect at all on the kiwifruit industry.
California Kiwifruit Comm’n v. Moss, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d
138 (Cal. App. 1996).
STATE TAXATION
FARMER . The plaintiff owned a farm which was
enrolled in the Vermont Working Farm Tax Abatement
Program (WFTAP) under which the plaintiff was assessed
lower property taxes on the farm. The WFTAP required the
repayment of the abated taxes if the property was sold to
someone other than a farmer, which was defined as persons
who received more than 50 percent of their income from the
operation of a farm on the abatement property. On
December 29, 1993, the plaintiff sold the farm to a couple,
one of whom worked as a university professor and the other
worked as a public school teacher. The plaintiff argued that
the purchasers began receiving more than 50 percent of their
income from farming as soon as the property was purchased
but failed to provide any evidence to support this claim. The
state provided evidence of the purchasers’ 1993 income tax
returns and a conversation with the purchasers to determine
that the purchasers did not receive more than one-half of
their income from the farm. The court held that the plaintiff
was r quired to repay the property tax benefits because the
plaintiff failed to prove the purchasers were farmers. The
court also ruled that a 1995 amendment to the WFTAP did
not retroactively apply to liberalize the definition of farmer
as to th  purchasers. Vallee v. State, 678 A.2d 1255 (Vt.
1996).
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ON THE WEB
http://members.aol.com/aglaw/agpub
Check out our internet site for information about:
• Agricultural Law Manual, by Neil E. Harl, a
comprehensive, annotated looseleaf deskbook.
• Principles of Agricultural Law,  college textbook, by
Roger A. McEowen and Neil E. Harl, due for publication in
December 1996.
• Seminar in Paradise, “Farm Estate and Business
Planning,” by Neil E. Harl in Hawaii, January 6-10, 1997.
• Direct internet links to legal resources on the internet.
• Direct email link to the Agricultural Law Press.
We welcome any suggestions for improving our web
site.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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